Crises and risk

Why Markets Crash: 1929 and 1987 as Two Case Studies

Two famous October crashes compared: what built the pressure, what happened in the decisive days and what changed afterwards.

  • By the Cana Tradero editorial team
  • Published
  • 6 min read

The crises line on our map has many stations, but two of them are visited more than any other: October 1929 and October 1987. Each crash began in New York, spread quickly and became shorthand for sudden loss. Comparing them is useful precisely because they were different. One unfolded over years and was followed by a depression; the other was concentrated in a single day and was not.

What we mean by a crash

Prices in a market move every day. A crash is different in two ways: the fall is large, and it is fast. It happens when many holders try to sell at the same time and there are not enough buyers at recent prices. Prices then drop until buyers appear, and the drop itself can force further selling.

Economists often describe the background as a combination of two things: a long period of rising prices that changes expectations, and a mechanism that amplifies selling once it starts. Neither alone is enough. Together, they can turn ordinary bad news into a rout.

1929: a rise on borrowed money

Through the late 1920s, share prices in New York rose strongly. Many buyers paid only part of the price and borrowed the rest from their brokers, a practice called buying on margin. Brokers in turn borrowed from banks and from companies with spare cash. As long as prices rose, the borrowing seemed safe.

Prices peaked in early September 1929. Over the following weeks they drifted lower, and in late October selling became overwhelming. On Thursday 24 October, and again on Monday 28 and Tuesday 29 October, volumes were so heavy that printed price reports ran hours behind events, so many people did not know what their holdings were worth. When prices fell, brokers demanded more cash from margin borrowers, and those who could not pay were sold out, pushing prices lower still.

The decline did not end in October. It continued in stages until mid-1932, by which time the main New York average stood close to 90 percent below its 1929 peak. Toronto and Montreal fell sharply as well. The crash was one cause of the Great Depression, alongside bank failures, a contraction in the money supply and falling world trade, but historians generally see it as a trigger and amplifier rather than the whole explanation.

1987: one day of selling

The 1987 crash looks very different on a calendar. Prices had risen strongly in the first part of the year, and in mid-October several days of falls followed news about trade deficits and interest rates. Then, on Monday 19 October, the main New York average fell by about 22.6 percent in a single session, still the largest one-day percentage fall in its history. Markets around the world fell too; in Toronto the main index dropped by roughly 11 percent that day.

Part of the explanation lies in strategies known as portfolio insurance. Large institutions had programmed rules to sell stock index futures as prices fell, in order to limit their losses. When many followed similar rules at once, their selling pushed prices down, which triggered more selling. Order-handling systems were overwhelmed, and prices in the futures and share markets became disconnected.

The two cases side by side

Comparing the two crashes
Comparison of the crashes of 1929 and 1987
Question 1929 1987
What built the pressure Years of rising prices, much of the buying done with borrowed money A strong rise earlier in the year, concerns about rates and trade
What amplified the selling Margin calls forcing borrowers to sell Portfolio insurance and program selling in futures
How long it lasted A decline in stages until mid-1932 Concentrated in a few days, above all one Monday
Response of authorities Limited and slow; banks were allowed to fail Prompt public commitment by the central bank to provide liquidity
Wider economy Followed by the Great Depression No depression followed

What changed afterwards

After 1929, the United States passed federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934, requiring companies to disclose information when selling shares to the public and creating a national securities regulator. The central bank gained power to set margin requirements. In Canada, provinces strengthened their own securities laws over the following decades, as our Toronto article describes.

After 1987, the response focused on market plumbing. The day after the crash, the American central bank announced that it stood ready to provide liquidity to the financial system. An official task force examined what had gone wrong, and exchanges introduced circuit breakers: rules that pause trading when prices fall by set amounts, giving participants time to reassess. Exchanges in Canada adopted similar mechanisms.

What the cases teach

The two cases share a structure: rising prices, a mechanism that links falling prices to more selling, and a moment when buyers step back. They differ in the response of authorities and in what happened to the wider economy. That difference is itself a lesson: the consequences of a crash depend heavily on what happens in banks and in policy afterwards.

What these cases cannot do is tell anyone when the next crash will happen. Each was obvious in hindsight and surprising at the time. History helps us understand risk; it does not remove it.

Educational content, not advice. This article describes historical events for learning purposes. All investments carry risk, including the possible loss of capital, and past market behaviour is not a reliable indicator of future results.

Next stop: back to the start of the line in Amsterdam, 1602

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